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ABSTRACT 
 
  This paper will examine the history and recent development of anti-obesity 
programs adopted in the United States and abroad.  The paper will pay particular 
attention to the theoretical premises on which each initiative relies, identifying two 
general ideological categories: (1) information campaigns that assume obesity rates are 
high at least partially because people do not know how or why it is important to live a 
healthy lifestyle, and (2) programs that rely on direct government intervention in order to 
make unhealthy lifestyle choices more difficult or more costly.  After discussing the 
impact of the United States’ campaigns, which have largely relied on educational 
programs to reverse historic obesity rates, the paper will suggest that direct intervention 
programs like those implemented by some foreign countries may be the more appropriate 
course.  The paper will conclude with a specific proposal to enlarge the role of the FDA 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  Historic obesity rates, both in the United States and around the world, have 
become a well-documented and salient political issue.
1  In 2003, the International Obesity 
Task Force estimated that 1.1 billion people were overweight or obese world-wide.
2  The 
Center for Disease Control (“CDC”) estimated that fifteen percent of the American 
population was obese in 1980, a figure that doubled to thirty-one percent in 2002.
3  A 
2008 study estimated over thirty-three percent of American adults to be obese.
4  Today, 
obese and unhealthily overweight American adults significantly outnumber healthy adults 
sixty-eight to thirty-two percent.
5   Although American children suffer from obesity at a 
percentage significantly lower than American adults, that percentage is rising at an even 
                                                 
1  See e.g. Wendy C. Perdue, Obesity, Poverty, and the Built Environment: Challenges 
and Opportunities, 15 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 821 (2008); The Obesity Society, 
http://www.obesity.org (last visited March 29, 2010); The President’s Challenge, 
http://www.presidentschallenge.org (last visited March 30, 2010) (“The President's 
Challenge is a program that encourages all Americans to make being active part of their 
everyday lives.”); Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) To Do About Obesity: A Moderate 
Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1366-68 (2005) (challenging the designation of 
obesity as an “epidemic” and arguing that individual lifestyle choices are too varied, and 
the science too muddled, for government programs to significantly reduce American’s 
collective waistline). 
2  See Press Statement, International Obesity Task Force (August 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.iotf.org/media/iotfaug25.htm.  
3  See Graham M. Catlin, A More Palatable Solution? Comparing the Viability of Smart 
Growth Statutes to Other Legislative Methods of Controlling the Obesity Epidemic, 2007 
WIS. L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2007); see also National Center for Health Statistics, 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2000 CDC Growth Charts for the United 
States: Methods and Development, Vital and Health Statistics, May 2002, at 13 fig. 2 
(2002). 
4  See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Prevalence and Trends in Obesity Among US Adults, 
1999-2008, 303(3) JAMA 235 (2010), available at http://jama.ama-
assn.org/cgi/content/full/2009.2014#BIBL. 
5  Id.   
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faster rate—the childhood obesity rate tripled in the years between 1980 and 2006.
6  
However, the impact of these figures is not clear.  While some academics dispute the 
extent of obesity’s negative health consequences,
7 medical associations have consistently 
published information linking obesity with an increased risk of heart, liver, and kidney 
disease, as well as cancer, depression, and premature death.
8  In 2000, the CDC 
determined that the yearly cost of obesity in the United States was 117 billion dollars—
61 billion in direct medical costs and 56 billion dollars for indirect costs.
9 
  The United States, along with many other countries, has taken affirmative steps to 
stem and eventually reverse the growth of the obese and overweight population.  
However, while these countries share a common goal, they have elected to address the 
obesity epidemic with drastically different programs.  For example, the vast majority of 
American anti-obesity programs merely disseminate nutritional or exercise information in 
order to educate its citizens on how to live a healthier life.  In contrast, the United 
Kingdom has supplemented its educational programs by eliminating the advertisement of 
unhealthy food products to children, while Japan has enacted a complex regulatory 
scheme that literally measures the waistlines of its populace.  In addition to 
demonstrating a lack of consensus concerning the best method to combat obesity, the 
                                                 
6  See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Preventing Obesity and Chronic 
Diseases Through Good Nutrition and Physical Activity 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/publications/factsheets/Prevention/pdf/obesity.pdf. 
7  See e.g. Katerine Mayer, An Unjust War: The Case Against the Government's War on 
Obesity, 92 GEO. L.J. 999 (2004) (arguing that fitness, not weight, should be the relevant 
metric for health and that the focus on weight exaggerates the impact of obesity).  
8  See e.g. National Heart Lung and Blood Institute Obesity Education Initiative, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/public/heart/obesity/lose_wt/risk.htm (last visited March 
29, 2010). 
9  See Preventing Obesity and Chronic Diseases (2005), supra n. 6.     
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underlying assumptions on which these programs rely indicate that there is no agreement 
on what is responsible for the epidemic.   
  Despite the lack of agreement, anti-obesity programs generally address obesity in 
one of two ways, they either (1) spread information that enables autonomous citizens to 
make healthier lifestyle choices, or (2) directly intervene in citizens’ lives to make 
unhealthy lifestyle choices more difficult or more costly.  To this date, the United States 
has embraced programs that inform the public, with only limited experimentation in the 
latter method.  However, in addition to a variety of educational programs similar to those 
found in the United States, countries across the world have begun to implement programs 
premised on large-scale intervention into the lifestyle choices of their citizens.   
  This paper will examine the theoretical framework underlying each of these 
general categories of anti-obesity programs.  The paper will begin with an outline of the 
relationship between obesity and the FDA, the federal agency most responsible for 
educating and counseling Americans about what to eat.  Section III examines the free 
market ideology that has driven the education campaigns sponsored by the federal 
government, as well as the new wave of restaurant menu regulations which continues this 
tradition.  Section IV will discuss the decidedly anti-free market programs adopted by 
some foreign nations, as well as the fledgling steps taken by American state and local 
governments to implement the approach.  Finally, Section V will address whether the 
information-centric methods used by the United States should continue to be the 
dominant anti-obesity technique, and proposes that the FDA take a new role in order to 
facilitate state and local government experimentation with anti-obesity programs.   
  4 
II.  THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE FDA 
 
  The United States has provided some form of dietary guidance since the creation 
of the Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) in 1862.
10  Initially, this function was 
conducted exclusively by the USDA.  It was the first agency to formally investigate the 
relationship between nutrition and agriculture, and published the caloric, protein, 
carbohydrate, fat, and “mineral matters” of several common foods in the 1890’s.
11  In the 
1950’s, the USDA created the “Basic Four” food groups, a predecessor to the more 
familiar Food Guide Pyramid developed in the early 1990’s.
12   Today, the USDA and 
FDA share responsibility for the federal government’s dietary guidelines
13, while the 
FDA has been charged with implementing more specific directives to address the 
“obesity epidemic”
14 
  A.  The FDA and Dietary Guidance 
 
  The FDA’s first foray into nutrition labeling occurred in 1941, when the agency 
promulgated regulations for foods that purported a “special dietary use” on account of 
their vitamin or mineral content.
15  Only five vitamins and four minerals were initially 
recognized as dietary supplements.
16  Under the regulation, products claiming a special 
dietary use were required to bear a product label that listed the minimum daily value of 
                                                 
10  See Kelli K. Garcia, The Fat Fight: The Risks And Consequences Of The Federal 
Government's Failing Public Health Campaign, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 529, 530 (2007) 
(citing Marion Nestle, FOOD POLITICS 33 (University of California Press 2003)). 
11  Id. at 558. 
12  Id. 
13  See 21 U.S.C. 5341. 
14  See Section II.B, infra. 
15  21 C.F.R. § 125 (1941). 
16   Id. § 125.3 - .4.  
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the recognized supplement it contained, as well as a disclaimer stating that the need for 
any additional vitamin or mineral contained in the product had not been established.
17  In 
1973, the FDA expanded labeling requirements to include some foods intended for 
general consumption.  The FDA promulgated a regulation interpreting Section 201(n) of 
the Food and Cosmetics Act to require a comprehensive nutrition label whenever a 
manufacturer added a nutrient to a food or made any representation regarding its nutrient 
content.
18   
  Comprehensive nutrition labeling was not required until 1990, when Congress 
passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (the “NLEA”).
19  However, 
these “comprehensive labels” do not include all nutrition information.  The statute 
recognizes that consumers have limited time and inclination to read nutrition information, 
and that nutrition listing should be limited to the information necessary to assist 
consumers in choosing foods wisely.
20  In fact, “section 403(q)(2)(B) gives the agency 
authority to exclude any nutrient from the declaration requirement, despite its 
presumptive public health importance, when the agency finds that the information “is not 
necessary to assist consumers in maintaining healthy dietary practices . . . .”
21  As the 
                                                 
17  See Michael Sachs, Ephedra and the Failure of Dietary Supplement Regulation, 54 
CATH. U. L. REV. 661, 668 (Winter 2004) (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 125.3(2), 125.4(2)). 
18  38 Fed. Reg. 2125 (Jan. 19, 1973). 
19  Pub. L. No. 101-535, § 2, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1)). 
20  See Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right-to-Know, 52 FOOD, DRUG L. 
J. 49, 54 (1997). 
21  Id.  
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only information most consumers review before purchasing their food, these labels are 
intended to play an important role in facilitating healthy eating habits.
22 
  The FDA is now jointly responsible for the dietary guidelines historically 
promulgated by the USDA.  Under the National Nutritional Monitoring and Related 
Research Act of 1990, the FDA and USDA are required to publish guidelines that reflect 
healthy eating habits.
23  In the past, these guidelines had been issued voluntarily by the 
USDA and the Department of Health and Human Services.
24  The familiar Food Guide 
Pyramid was released pursuant to this statute in 1992.
25  The current dietary guidelines, 
which include an individualized new pyramid called the “MyPyramid”, are significantly 
more complex than their original manifestation.  In addition to recommended values of 
key nutrients, MyPyramid’s interactive website includes references to exercise and food 
safety.
26   
  B.  The FDA’s Targeted Response to Obesity 
 
  In 2003, the Commissioner of the FDA established the Obesity Working Group 
(“OWG”).  The OWG was charged with examining obesity issues, formulating 
recommendations, and proposing a plan of action.
27  The OWG invited members of the 
food industry, academics, and consumer group representatives for several public 
                                                 
22  See id. 
23  See 21 U.S.C. 5341. 
24  See Garcia, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. at 561.   
25  Id. 
26  See MyPyramid.gov, http://www.MyPyramid.gov (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). 
27  See Cynthia Newton, "The Role and Responsibility of the FDA in the Obesity 
Epidemic" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the MPSA Annual National 
Conference, Palmer House Hotel, Hilton, Chicago, IL (Apr 03, 2008), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p268707_index.html.  
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meetings, which focused on the impact of calories consumed and other scientific topics, 
rather than the environmental factors or lifestyle choices that influence behavior.
28  The 
proposals generated by the OWG primarily involved emphasizing caloric information, 
encouraging comparative labeling statements, and increasing enforcement against 
misleading weight loss products.
29  In 2006, the FDA’s Keystone Forum Report 
recommended that consumers should be provided with nutrition information when eating 
at restaurants or other “away-from-home” food establishments.
30   
III.  REDUCING OBESITY BY CORRECTING MARKET FAILURES 
 
  As discussed in Section II, the vast majority of federal obesity and dietary 
programs are intended to educate the public.  For example, the information contained in 
MyPyramid outlines healthy lifestyle choices, including recommended levels of calories, 
fats, and carbohydrates, while nutrition labels provide consumers with the information 
necessary to select the foods that meet their dietary needs.  These resources equip 
interested consumers to make healthy dietary choices on their own.  In addition to basic 
nutrition information provided by the FDA, almost every agency even tangentially related 
to food or physical exercise has launched its own information campaign.
31  Many 
                                                 
28   See id. 
29  See id.  For a detailed report of the OWG’s proposals, see Questions and Answers - 
The FDA's Obesity Working Group Report, Food and Drug Administration (page last 
updated May 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ReportsResearch/UCM082094.   
30  See Backgrounder - Keystone Forum on Away-From-Home Foods: Opportunities for 
Preventing Weight Gain and Obesity Report, Food and Drug Administration (June 2, 
2006), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/ReportsResearch/ucm082064.htm. 
31   The number of government sponsored educational programs related to eating habits or 
exercise is staggering.  A small sample of government funded educational programs 
includes: Small Step, Healthier US, The President's Challenge, Fitness.gov, Physical  
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agencies devote significant resources to these “lifestyle” programs.  In 2004, the 
Department of Education was scheduled to spend $70 million on programs to encourage 
“lifetime fitness activities and healthy eating habits.”
32  Politicians at every level of 
government seem to have addressed the issue in one way or another.  On March 17, 2010, 
First Lady Michelle Obama visited the country’s fattest state (Mississippi) to discuss 
obesity’s impact on everything from the nation’s healthcare costs to school-children’s 
classroom learning.
33 
  Although these education campaigns may emphasize different health-related 
information, they are all premised on the belief that educating obese and overweight 
Americans will change their behavior.  In other words, they all presume a particular kind 
of market failure
34— that the current rate of obesity is not the product of reasoned 
lifestyle choices made by informed actors, but the distorted result of a population without 
access to the information necessary to make the right choices.
35  “As public health law 
                                                                                                                                                
Activity for Everyone, Weight Control Information Network, MyPyramid, MyPyramid 
Tracker, BAM: Body and Mind, Powerful Bones and Powerful Girls, VERB: It's what 
you Do, and Small Steps for Kids.  See Garcia, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. at 536, supra n. 10.   
32  See id. at 534. 
33  See Press Release, Office of the First Lady, Remarks by the First Lady at Newsweek 
Q&A Event (March 17, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-first-lady-newsweek-qa-event. 
34  At a basic economic level, a market failure exists when a market inefficiently allocates 
goods or services.  See Paul Krugman and Robin Wells, ECONOMICS, Worth Publishers, 
New York, (2006).  In other words, market failures exist when actors make choices that 
do not maximize their self-interest.  For example, when a seller is willing to sell his 
widget for five dollars and a buyer is willing to buy that widget for ten dollars, a 
transaction for a price in between five and ten dollars should always occur.  A market is 
considered to have failed when, despite these conditions, no transaction takes place.  
Because both the seller and the buyer would have been better off had the transaction 
occurred, some factor must have intervened and caused the market to fail.   
35  See e.g. Physical Activity Topics, Center for Disease Control, 
http://www.cdc.gov/physicalactivity (last visited March 28, 2010) (promoting fitness  
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scholar, Lawrence O. Gostin, notes, by supporting these campaigns, the government is 
thought to promote individual autonomy and provide the basic support needed to enable 
people to lead healthy lives.”
36  The belief inherent in each educational program is that 
obesity may be combated simply by broadcasting the relevant information and waiting 
for individuals to change their behavior on their own. 
  Educational programs cannot succeed if the dietary “market” is not failing in this 
specific way.  For example, climbing Mount Everest is extremely dangerous and has 
caused hundreds of deaths.  However, the experienced climbers who brave the mountain 
are all prepared for their trek and well-aware of the risks and past casualties.  In this 
situation, an education campaign on the dangers of climbing to the earth’s highest peak is 
unlikely to dissuade these skilled and knowledgeable climbers.  This is because the 
“market” for climbing Mount Everest is not failing; generally, people who climb the 
mountain are making informed decisions based on the relevant information.  Climbers 
engage in this risky activity because other interests outweigh the risks, not because they 
are not fully aware of the danger.  In fact, the danger of climbing the mountain may be a 
motivating factor in some peoples’ interest.  Similarly, if obese Americans choose to eat 
unhealthy foods because short-term monetary, temporal, or taste benefits outweigh the 
potential long-term health costs, spreading duplicative information should not change 
their behavior.  If obese Americans forgo regular exercise because of work and family 
commitments, merely reinforcing that exercise is beneficial will not be effective. 
                                                                                                                                                
program as “[d]esigned for kids 9–13 years old, BAM! Body and Mind gives them the 
information they need to make healthy lifestyle choices.”). 
36 Garcia, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. at 537, supra n. 10.  
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  Nutrition labels on packaged foods and dietary pyramids are likely the most well-
known programs that spread dietary information.  However, many state and local 
governments have chosen to supplement this information with more stringent labeling 
requirements for food sold by chain restaurants in their jurisdictions.  Like the myriad of 
federal information campaigns, these regulations hope to alter consumer behavior by 
providing information not available, and ostensibly not fully considered, by restaurant 
consumers.  Just as FDA mandated nutrition labels equip consumers to make healthy 
choices in the supermarket, restaurant menu labeling laws are intended to facilitate the 
same informed decision-making by customers waiting in line at McDonalds. 
A.  Menu Labeling: Municipal-level Regulation 
 
  Several municipal governments have recently required restaurants with a 
minimum number of locations to post the calorie information on menus and menu 
boards.
37  New York City was the first American governmental body to enact menu 
labeling laws.
38 While New York City’s first menu labeling regulation was struck down 
for only including restaurants that voluntarily disclosed nutritional information,
39 the 
second iteration withstood constitutional attack and was upheld by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals in 2009.
40  The new regulation, which applies to all food service 
establishments with fifteen or more locations, requires the total number of calories of 
each dish to be placed on the menu or menu board.  In order to ensure the program’s 
                                                 
37  Wendy N. Davis, Biting Back at Obesity: The Big Apple's Calorie-Counting Law Is 
Staying on the Menu, 95-AUG A.B.A. J. 17, 18 (2009).   
38  Anthony J. Marks, Menu Labeling Laws: A Survey, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. 90, 91 (Fall 
2009). 
39  Id. 
40  See N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 118 (2nd Cir. 
2009).  
  11 
efficacy, the “[f]ont and format used for calorie information must be at least as prominent 
in size as is used for the name or price of the menu item.”
41 
  Westchester County, New York adopted a practically identical labeling scheme in 
2008.
42  King County, Washington implemented a more comprehensive regulation on 
December 31, 2008.
43   In addition to disclosing the calorie information of menu items, 
restaurants with fifteen or more locations and one million dollars in annual sales must list 
the saturated fat, sodium, and carbohydrate information for foods and beverages on their 
menus.
44  Similarly, Multnomah County, Oregon requires restaurants with fifteen or more 
locations to affirmatively post calorie information on menus, but must disclose saturated 
fat, trans fat, carbohydrate, and sodium information only upon request.
45   
B.  Menu Labeling: State-level Regulation 
 
  On September 30, 2008, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger amended the 
California Health and Safety Code by signing Senate Bill 1420 into law.
46   California 
now requires food facilities that are part of a chain of twenty or more locations to provide 
nutrition information to its customers.
47  The requirement will be implemented in two 
                                                 
41  Marks, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. at 91, supra n. 38 (quoting Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, 
Nutrition Labeling in Chain Restaurants: State and Local Bills/Regulations—2007-2008, 
www.cspinet.org/nutritionpolicy/MenuLabelingBills2007-2008.pdf). 
42  Laws of County of Westchester, New York, § 708.01 (Local Law No. 13) (2008). 
43  Marks, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. at 92, supra n. 38. 
44  Id. 
45  Multnomah County Health Dep't, Policy Order 08-114.  For more information, visit 
Chronic Disease Prevention Program, Multnomah County Health Department, 
http://mchealth.org/chronic/labeling.shtml (last visited March 27, 2010).  
46  Marks, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. at 91, supra n. 38. 
47  As defined by the regulation, “‘[f]ood facility’ means a food facility in the state that 
operates under common ownership or control with at least 19 other food facilities with 
the same name in the state that offer for sale substantially the same menu items, or  
  12 
stages.  Beginning on July 1, 2009, covered food facilities were required to “‘provide a 
brochure placed at the point of sale that includes[,]’ at a minimum, information about 
calories, sodium, saturated fat, and carbohydrates for each standard menu item.”
48  By 
July 1, 2011, covered food facilities must list calorie information on menus, menu boards, 
and food display tags next to the standard item.
49  California’s menu labeling requirement 
explicitly preempts local law on the subject.
50   
  Several states have passed but not yet implemented their own menu labeling laws.  
Both Maine and Oregon passed their own regulations in June 2009.
51  Additionally, menu 
labeling laws are currently being considered Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.
52  However, not all state governments 
support additional labeling requirements.  Connecticut’s recently passed menu labeling 
bill was vetoed by the Governor, while both Utah and Georgia have affirmatively 
prohibited local governments from regulating the posting of nutrition information on 
menus and menu boards.
53    
                                                                                                                                                
operates as a franchised outlet of a parent company with at least 19 other franchised 
outlets with the same name in the state that offer for sale substantially the same menu 
items . . .”  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094(a) (West 2009).  Farmers 
markets, grocery stores, vending machines and some other establishments are excluded 
from the requirement.  See id.   
48  Marks, 29 FRANCHISE L.J. at 91, supra n. 38. 
49  Id.  
50  Id. 
51  Id. at 93. 
52  Id.  
53  Id.  
  13 
C.  Menu Labeling: Federal-level Regulation 
  Congress’ recent passage of the Democratic-sponsored health care legislation may 
moot the recent flurry of state-level enactments.   In addition to its core provisions 
dealing with health insurance, the bill President Obama signed on March 23, 2010 
included a menu labeling requirement modeled after the existing policies in New York 
City, California, and Oregon.
54  Once implemented, the federal law will require chains 
with twenty or more locations to “disclose calorie counts on their food items and supply 
information on how many calories a healthy person should eat in a day.”
55  Surprisingly, 
after fighting similar measures in courthouses around the country,
56 the National 
Restaurant Association supported the bill.
57  However, as a spokeswoman from the 
National Restaurant Association essentially admitted, the organization’s support of the 
federal measure was likely spurred by the possibility of a conflicting patchwork of state 
regulations rather than a sudden change of heart.
58 
  It should be unsurprising that, after investing decades and hundreds of millions (if 
not billions) of dollars in educational campaigns, the federal government has continued to 
battle obesity with information.  While it is unlikely many Americans are virulently 
opposed to seeing calorie counts on their menus, the passage of this provision is 
                                                 
54  Stephanie Rosenbloom, Calorie Data to be Posted at Most Chains, New York Times 
at B1(March 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business/24menu.html. 
55  Id.  
56  See e.g. N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n, 556 F.3d 114, supra n. 40. 
57  Rosenbloom, supra n. 54. 
58   Id. (According to the National Restaurant Association’s Sue Hensley, “[t]he 
association and the industry were supportive because consumers will see the same types 
of information in more than 200,000 restaurant locations across the country.”).  
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worrisome for another reason.  Overshadowed by the more controversial aspects of the 
health care bill, the menu labeling provision received little public discussion on the floors 
of the House and Senate.
59  Although individual politicians have floated vague proposals 
that do more than offer information,
60 Congress has not appeared to seriously consider 
whether merely informing its citizens is sufficient to control the escalating rate of 
American obesity.    
IV.  REDUCING OBESITY BY CREATING MARKET DISTORTIONS 
 
  Although an observer of the federal government may not realize it, not all anti-
obesity programs are educational.  Some programs attempt to reduce obesity by 
interfering with the factors that contribute to unhealthy lifestyle choices.  Unlike 
educational programs, direct intervention programs do not rely on the assumption that 
obesity rates are high because people do not have access to the relevant information.
61  
As the American obesity epidemic continues and worsens, some states have adopted, and 
the federal government has flirted, with direct government intervention to influence the 
public’s lifestyle choices.   
  Direct government intervention operates under a theoretical framework very 
different than the market failure theory discussed, supra Section III.  Education programs 
are premised on the assumption that people would make healthier lifestyle choices when 
                                                 
59  Id.  
60  See e.g. David Saltonstall, President Obama says 'Sin Tax' on Sodas is Food For 
Thought, Despite Gov. Paterson's Failed Proposal, N.Y. Daily News (September 9, 
2009), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2009/09/08/2009-09-
08_president_obama_says_sin_tax_on_sodas_is_food_for_thought.html. 
61  Although these programs do not rely on this assumption, they can still be effective 
even if the assumption is true.  Direct intervention programs can operate effectively 
regardless of whether ignorance contributes to obesity levels as long as there are other 
causal factors that can be suppressed or eliminated.  
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exposed to the right information.  In stark contrast, the goal of direct government 
intervention is to intentionally distort the market—essentially to create a market failure—
in a way that induces individuals to reach the government-preferred outcome.  These 
programs are paternalistic.  In essence, the government has observed the choices made by 
individuals in the free market, disagreed with the outcomes which result, and intervened 
in order to push individuals toward “better” choices.  Harkening back to the Mount 
Everest example in Section III, supra, a government interested in reducing deaths on 
Mount Everest could prohibit all advertising relating to the climb, tax all climbers who 
make the trip, or simply ban travel to Nepal altogether.  Each would likely be far more 
effective at reducing deaths than an elaborate and potentially costly education campaign, 
but would entail significant government intervention into each climber’s decision-
making.   
  For obvious reasons, government programs that directly distort the market in 
order to influence individual choices are much more controversial than educational 
programs that merely provide information to autonomous citizens.  Due to a political 
climate is particularly resistant to some types of government intervention in the “free 
market,” the most invasive programs are located outside of the United States. This 
Section will address three ways that governments have attempted to directly intervene in 
response to the obesity epidemic: (A) eliminating advertising of unhealthy foods; (B) 
creating economic disincentives for taking part in unhealthy behavior; and (C) 
eliminating access to unhealthy foods.    
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A.  Controlling Advertising of Unhealthy Foods 
 
  It is well-established that advertising has a profound effect on what consumers 
choose to purchase.
62  Every year 400 billion dollars is spent on advertising worldwide, 
200 billion in the United States alone.
63  Unfortunately for American waistlines, the food 
advertised on television is decidedly unhealthy.  While all Americans frequently see 
candy and junk food commercials, children are targeted by these advertisements at a 
disproportionately high rate.  According to a Kaiser Family Foundation study released in 
2007, more than forty percent of all television advertisements viewed by children are for 
candy, snacks, or fast food.
64  Children eight to twelve view an average of fifty hours of 
advertisements for unhealthy foods each year.
65  Vicky Rideout, quoted on behalf of the 
Kaiser Family Foundation when the study was released, stated that the study 
demonstrated that “[t]he vast majority of the foods that kids see advertised on television 
today are for products that nutritionists would tell us they need to be eating less of, not 
more of, if we're going to get a handle on childhood obesity.”
66  Non-television 
                                                 
62  See e.g. Daniel A. Ackerberg. Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in 
Experience Good Markets: A Structural Empirical Examination, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC REVIEW, Vol. 44, No. 3, August 2003, pp. 1007-1040. 
63  See Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, Behavioralism, and Counter 
Advertising in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (2003).   
64  See Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, “Kids Get Diet Of Junk Food Commercials,” CBS 
News: Health (March 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/03/28/health/main2620036.shtml.  
65  See id.  
66  Id.  
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advertisements may be even more skewed, as children are estimated to see approximately 
40,000 advertisements per year, 72% of which are for fast food, candy, or cereal.
67 
  Recent research has attempted to establish a causal link between food 
advertisements and the high rates of obesity in the United States.  In 2008, a group of 
economists affiliated with the National Bureau of Economic Research released the 
findings of a longitudinal study that analyzed the relationship between a children’s 
exposure to fast food advertising and their weight.
68  According to the study, the data 
showed a “strong positive effect of exposure to fast-food restaurant advertising on the 
probability that children and adolescents are overweight.”
69  Although the authors noted 
that citing their study as a partial explanation for obesity was “premature”, they went on 
to discuss how an outright ban on fast-food advertising would affect childhood obesity 
rates.
70  “A complete advertising ban on television would reduce the number of 
overweight children ages 3-11 in a fixed population by 18 percent. [citation omitted].  
The impact of this policy for adolescents ages 12-18 amounts to a smaller decline of 14 
percent.”
71  Other studies have reached similar conclusions.
72 
                                                 
67  See Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity: The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2601, 2606-07 (2006). 
68  See Chou, Rashad, & Grossman, Fast-Food Restaurant Advertising on Television and 
its Influence on Childhood Obesity, 51 J.L. & ECON. 599 (2008). 
69  Id. at 616. 
70  Id. 
71  Id.  The authors note that these figures could potentially both under and over represent 
the impact of a fast-food advertising ban.  The figures may under represent a ban’s 
impact because the study accounted for only “local or spot television advertising and 
ignore advertising associated with network, syndicated, and cable television.”  On the 
other hand, the figures may over represent the prospective decline in obesity because the 
study ignored the impact of non-television advertising.  See id.  
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  Several countries have acted to control the information disseminated through 
advertisements.  By controlling what information reaches the public, advertising bans 
hope to artificially reduce the demand for the unhealthy products thought to be at least 
partly responsible for historic obesity rates.  A few countries have opted for an outright 
ban on all advertising targeting children.  For example, Sweden prohibits all 
advertisements, regardless of medium, designed to attract the attention of children under 
twelve years old.
73  Norway prohibits all television advertising in connection with 
children’s programming or when directed at children.
74  However, this Section will focus 
on the advertising ban in the United Kingdom, which is specifically tailored to limit the 
exposure of children to advertisements of unhealthy food products. 
1.  Advertising Ban in the United Kingdom 
 
   The British Office of Communications (“Ofcom”), the United Kingdom’s 
regulatory agency with authority over television and radio broadcasts, instituted a limited 
ban on certain food advertisements in 2007.
75  The ban prohibits certain foods from being 
advertised “in or adjacent to children's programmes or programmes commissioned for, 
principally directed at or likely to appeal particularly to audiences below the age of 16.”
76  
                                                                                                                                                
72  See Susan Linn & Courtney Novosat, Obesity Rates Mirror Rise in Marketing; History 
of Television Deregulation Complicit, 615 ANNALS 133, 134-35 (2008) (“the heavy 
marketing of high-calorie and low-nutrient foods and fast food outlets represents a 
probable increased risk for childhood obesity”). 
73  See Effects of Advertising Restrictions in Other Jurisdictions, Obesity Policy Coalition 
(April 2007), available at www.opc.org.au/download.asp?RelatedLinkID=86. 
74  See id. 
75 Press Release, Office of Commc'ns, Ofcom Publishes Final Statement on the 
Television Advertising of Food and Drink Products to Children (Feb. 22, 2007), available 
at http://www.ofcom.org.uk/media/news/2007/02/nr_20070222. 
76  Id.  
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Even advertisements not slotted in or adjacent to children’s programming must avoid 
broadcasting unhealthy messages.  “Advertisements must avoid anything likely to 
encourage poor nutritional habits or an unhealthy lifestyle in children.”
77  Ofcom’s final 
report provides several examples of the kind of commercials that would be prohibited.  
Advertisements that condoned attitudes consistent with poor diets, like a dislike of 
vegetables, may not be aired.
78  While an advertisement featuring a child eating a candy 
bar passes muster, the ban “would, however, preclude someone being shown eating 
whole boxes of chocolates in one sitting.”
79   
  Although Ofcom promulgated the policy’s framework, it left the Food Standards 
Agency (“FSA”) to determine exactly which foods would be affected by the ban.  The 
FSA developed a food categorization model “which recognises the contribution made by 
beneficial nutrients that are important in a child's diet (protein, fibre, fruit and vegetables, 
and nuts) and penalises foods with ingredients that children should eat less of (saturated 
fats, salt and sugars).”
80  The FSA model produces two food groups: (1) foods high in fat, 
salt, and sugar, which may not be advertised in or adjacent to children’s programming; 
and (2) all other foods, which may be aired in any time slot.  All food advertisements 
must not promote unhealthy eating habits regardless of their FSA categorization. 
                                                 
77  Id.  
78  See David Darwin, Advertising Obesity: Can the U.S. Follow The Lead of the UK in 
Limiting Television Marketing of Unhealthy Foods to Children?, 42 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 317, 327(2009). 
79  See id. 
80  Id. at 327 (quoting Food Standards Agency, Nutrient Profiling, 
http://www.food.gov.uk/healthiereating/advertisingtochildren/nutlab/ (last visited March 
21, 2010).  
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2.  Proposed American Legislation 
   
  Organized groups of American citizens have petitioned for greater government 
control over “junk food” advertisements for decades.  In 1970, several public interest 
groups petitioned the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to promulgate rules to address 
“a generation of fat children with decaying teeth who are intellectually passive, prone to 
violence, and profoundly materialistic.”
81  FTC staff responded by recommending a 
highly restrictive set of regulations that would have severely limited advertisements 
targeted at children.  The proposed rules would have banned all commercials targeting 
children under eight and all commercials for “high sugar” products targeting children 
eight to twelve.
82  “High sugar” advertisers targeting consumers above the age of twelve 
would be forced to create “counter ads” that promoted healthy foods and oral hygiene.
83  
Despite initial support from the FTC administrators, the proposals engendered significant 
political backlash and were never implemented.
84  
  Despite the negative political reaction inspired by the proposed bans, Congress 
arguably gave the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) the opportunity to craft 
significant advertising regulations in the Children’s Television Act of 1990 (“CTA”).  
While the CTA did not ban any particular content in advertisements, it limited advertising 
during children’s programming to ten and a half minutes per hour during the weekend 
and twelve minutes per hour during the week.
85  The CTA left the implementation and 
                                                 
81  Susan Bartlett Foote & Robert H. Mnookin, The “Kid Vid” Crusade, 61 PUB. INT. 90, 
92 (1980). 
82  See The Elephant in the Room, 116 HARV. L. REV. at 1172, supra n. 63. 
83  See id. 
84  For an extended discussion of the reaction to these proposed rules, see id.   
85  See Darwin, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. at 323, supra n. 78.  
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oversight of these requirements to the FCC, and permitted the FCC to modify the 
advertising time limits “in accordance with the public interest.”
86  Despite some public 
pressure, the FCC has never modified these time limits.
87 
  Regulating the advertisement of unhealthy foods to children again became a 
prominent political topic in the mid 2000’s.  In 2004, the Institute of Medicine asked the 
food and beverage industries to voluntarily cease advertising unhealthy products to 
children and recommended establishing nutrition standards that would differentiate 
healthy foods from unhealthy foods.
88  In 2006, the FCC commissioned a Task Force on 
Media and Childhood Obesity: Today and Tomorrow (“Task Force”) constituted of 
sitting Senators, FCC personnel, television networks, children’s advocacy groups and 
representatives from the food and beverage industries.
89  However, unlike Ofcom’s 
directive, the Task Force was created to explore how a reduction in unhealthy 
advertisements could be accomplished through industry self-regulation, rather than strict 
government policy.
90  Although some American politicians have called for a targeted 
advertising ban similar to the United Kingdom’s,
91 no additional advertising restrictions 
have been enacted.  Whether a victory for autonomous citizens or a defeat in the “battle” 
against obesity, the United States has not successfully limited advertisements that fuel the 
consumption of unhealthy food products.   
                                                 
86  Id. 
87  See id at 324. 
88  See id. 
89  See id. 
90  See id. 
91  Congressman Ed Markey, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet, has been one of the most vocal proponents of 
regulating unhealthy food advertisements targeted at children.  See id.  
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B.  Establishing Economic Incentives for Healthy Behavior 
 
   While restrictions on advertising attempt to surreptitiously influence consumer 
choices by withholding information otherwise available, programs that rely on economic 
incentives are a far blunter tool.  In most cases, consumers are painfully aware that their 
behavior is being influenced by government fiat.  For example, a government interested 
in lower obesity rates could simply require consumers pay an addition 50% “junk food 
tax” on all unhealthy food purchases.  In addition to raising revenue that could be used to 
fund other anti-obesity programs, the tax would create a market distortion by artificially 
lowering the demand for unhealthy food choices.
92  Several states have employed this 
kind of tax on cigarettes for years,
93 while seventeen states and two major cities have 
some sort of “junk food tax” on the books.
94   
                                                 
92  For example, a team of researchers published in the Archives of International 
Medicine estimated that, based on an analysis of the diets of a group of over 5,000 young 
adults and contemporaneous food prices, an eighteen percent tax on pizza and soda would 
reduce calorie intake by an average of fifty six per person, resulting in a weight loss of 
approximately five pounds.  See Reuters, Tax Soda, Pizza to Cut Obesity, Researchers 
Say, MSNBC.COM (March 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35770181/. 
93  For a summary of California’s cigarette taxes, see California State Board of 
Equalization, Cigarette and Tobacco Products Taxes, Excise Tax Facts, Pub. 93 (July 
2009), available at http://www.boe.ca.gov/pdf/pub93.pdf.  Despite the success of “sin 
taxes” in many state legislatures, there is still significant debate over their efficacy.  See 
e.g. Echu Liue, Patrick A. Rivers, and Paul D. Sarvela, Does Increasing Cigarette Excise 
Tax Improve People's Health? The Cases Of Heart Attacks And Stroke, 34 NO. 3 J. 
HEALTH CARE FIN. (ASPEN) 91 (2008) (finding no clear empirical evidence that raising 
cigarette excise taxes would lower morbidity rates associated with heart attack and 
stroke).   
94  Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing The “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed 
Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (2005) (“Many of the existing junk food taxes 
pre-dated the obesity epidemic and were enacted when there was much less concern 
about the health impact of such foods. . .  . It appears that most of these provisions were 
viewed simply as good sources of tax revenue.”).  
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  However, economic incentives may be more complex and comprehensive than a 
simple sales tax.  While a junk food tax may dissuade consumers from purchasing the 
taxed product, comprehensive programs are designed to induce citizens to take positive 
steps, such as exercising, in order to avoid economic sanction.  This Section will explore 
how Japan’s comprehensive health screening system arguably promotes healthy eating 
and exercise habits through the threat of monetary sanctions, as well as the fledgling 
steps taken in the United States to duplicate this model. 
1.  Japan’s “Metabo” Legislation 
 
  Japan spends approximately twenty trillion yen on social welfare and medical 
services annually, a number that rises about one trillion yen each year.
95  One-third of 
these health care costs are expended to address lifestyle-related diseases, including 
metabolic syndrome.
96  Controlling the financial cost of an overweight population is 
particularly critical in Japan, where a quickly expanding elderly population already 
strains the budgets of social programs.  Approximately ninety percent of the annual one 
trillion yen increase may be attributed to the elderly.
97  
  In early 2008, Japan implemented an aggressive anti-obesity program intended to 
control expanding health-related expenditures.  Instead of merely controlling access to 
                                                 
95 Christin Lawler, An International Perspective on Battling the Bulge: Japan's Anti-
Obesity Legislation And its Potential Impact on Waistlines Around the World, 11 SAN 
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 287, 290 (2009).  Japan has provided universal healthcare to its citizens 
for decades.  See id. 
96  See id.  Metabolic syndrome is the name for a cluster of conditions, including high 
blood pressure, high blood sugar levels, excess body fat, and abnormal cholesterol levels.  
See Metabolic syndrome. National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, 
http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health/dci/Diseases/ms/ms_all.html (last visited March 23, 
2010).  
97  Lawler, 11 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. at 290, supra n. 95.    
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information, Japan’s “Metabo” legislation took the extraordinary step of directly policing 
its citizens’ waistlines.  Each of Japan’s three primary health insurance plans
98 is charged 
with implementing the program and will ultimately be responsible for the monetary 
consequences of non-compliance.  The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare anticipates 
reducing the overweight and obese population of Japan by ten percent by 2012, and by 
twenty-five percent in 2015.
99 
  The program has two primary steps.
100  First, fifty-six million adults between the 
ages of eighteen and seventy-four will receive annual screenings for metabolic 
syndrome.
101  Men with measured waistlines above eighty-five centimeters and women 
with waistlines above ninety centimeters will receive individualized support by specially 
trained nurses.
102  In addition to designing a customized diet and exercise plan, these 
nurses are obligated to contact their patients every three to six months to monitor their 
progress and refer particularly severe cases to hospitals for more intensive treatment.
103 
                                                 
98  Each plan is responsible for a unique segment of the population.  The Employee 
Health Insurance program provides insurance for working adults and their dependents 
based on the size of their employer, while the National Health Insurance program is 
responsible for those employed by small business and the unemployed.  The Health and 
Medical Services System provides care for citizens age seventy and above.  See id. at 
292.  For a comprehensive discussion of Japan’s health care system, see Naohiro Yashiro 
et al., EVALUATING JAPAN'S HEALTH CARE REFORM OF THE 1990S AND ITS EFFORTS TO 
COPE WITH POPULATION AGING, IN HEALTH CARE ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
JAPAN (David A. Wise & Naohiro Yahsiro eds., 2006). 
99  Lawler, 11 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. at 291, supra n. 95.   
100  Id. (citing Norimitsu Onishi, Japan, Seeking Trim Waists, Measures Millions, N.Y. 
Times, June 13, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/13/world/asia/13fat.html). 
101  Id. at 293. 
102  Id. 
103  Id.  
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  The program’s second component requires an audit of the results of this screening 
process to be conducted in 2012.
104  Instead of directly fining citizens unable to trim a 
sufficient number of centimeters off their waistline, the government allocates the 
burgeoning cost of geriatric care based on the compliance and success rate of each health 
insurance plan’s Metabo Program.
105  For example, plans that do not meet the threshold 
sixty-five percent participation rate will be fined, while plans that do not effectuate a 
twenty-five percent reduction in the number of its insured suffering from metabolic 
syndrome will face a ten percent increase in its required contribution to the pooled 
healthcare fund for the elderly.
106   
2.  Obesity Penalties in State Insurance Programs 
 
  Escalating insurance and medical costs have led some states to adopt insurance 
schemes that require obese Americans to improve their health or pay a surcharge.  
Although the small steps taken by these states pale in comparison to Japan’s intrusive 
national program, they go far beyond the traditional education programs implemented by 
the federal government.  
  Alabama will be the first state to charge overweight state employees an additional 
twenty-five dollar surcharge for failing to improve their health.
107  In 2008, the State 
                                                 
104  Id. at 294. 
105  Id.  
106  Id. 
107  In defending the program from attacks of state paternalism, the CEO of Alabama’s 
Insurance Board has attempted to describe the system as a premium discount for healthy 
employees and employees improving their health, rather than a surcharge for the obese.  
See Alabama Fights Fat, Media with New Screening Program, Employee Benefit 
Advisor (August 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.alseib.org/PDF/SEHIP/EmployeeBenefitsNews.pdf.  However, despite his  
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Employees’ Insurance Board passed a plan that would apply the surcharge to all 
employees unless they participate in a free health screening.  If the screening discovers a 
serious problem with blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, or obesity, the state employee 
will be given one year of free access to a doctor or wellness program to facilitate a 
healthier lifestyle.
108  Employees that show progress at the conclusion of that year will 
not be charged the additional surcharge.  The first surcharge for employees that do not 
improve their health will be assessed in January of 2011.
109 
  However, despite the program’s similarity to Japan’s Metabo legislation, state 
officials are extremely careful to promote the plan’s educational component, rather than 
its economic penalty.  According to William Ashmore, the CEO of Alabama’s Insurance 
Board, the plan is not a fax tax.  Instead, “[w]hat we want to do is, number one, make the 
employee aware of any risk factors they may have . . . and then knock down the barriers 
so that they can go get the services they need.”
110  Rather than punishing people for their 
fat, Mr. Ashmore contends that, “[t]he state has been screening workers for 15 years and 
finds that 10% to 15% of at-risk employees are completely unaware of their health threat. 
The goal, he says, is to make sure everyone gets screened.”
111  North Carolina is currently 
                                                                                                                                                
efforts, the vast majority of news reports and media coverage have described the twenty-
five dollar payment as a surcharge or tax. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. 
110  Matt Sloane, Alabama to Link Premium Costs to Workers’ Health, CNN.COM: 
Health (December 9, 2008) available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/diet.fitness/09/19/alabama.obesity.insurance/index.
html. 
111 See Alabama Fights Fat, supra n. 107.  
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contemplating a similar program, which would provide a monetary incentive to 
overweight state workers beginning in 2011.
112 
C.  Removing Unhealthy Food Choices 
 
  At the time of writing, no government appears to have seriously considered a 
broad prohibition of high-calorie or generally unhealthy foods.  However, particularly 
progressive city governments, such as New York, San Francisco, and Boston, have 
successfully restricted the use of trans fat, a hydrogenated oil linked to high rates of 
“bad” cholesterol and heart disease, in foods sold by restaurants within their jurisdiction.  
In the last five years, each of these cities first voluntarily asked restaurants to cease using 
trans fats, and then eventually banned its use altogether.
 113  In 2009, California became 
the first state to completely ban the use of trans fats in food facilities.
114   While the 
success of the “trans fat movement” has indicated that some political bodies are open to 
proscribing the worst ingredients in restaurant meals, there is no indication that maximum 
fat or calorie content will be instituted anytime soon. 
  However, there is at least one exception to the American public’s general 
reticence to restrict food options on the basis of health.  Many state and municipal bodies 
have acted to remove unhealthy options from elementary and secondary schools.  For 
                                                 
112  See Mark Johnson, N.C. to Penalize Obese Workers, Those Who Smoke, The 
Charlotte Observer (October 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2009/10/07/988655/nc-to-penalize-obese-workers-
those.html. 
113 See generally Trans Fat News, BanTransFats.com Inc., 
http://www.bantransfats.com/transfatnews.html (last visited March 28, 2010). 
114  See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 114377(b)(1) (2009).  A food facility is defined as 
“an operation that stores, prepares, packages, serves, vends, or otherwise provides food 
for human consumption at the retail level . . . .”  Id. at § 113789(a).  The ban will not 
affect the preparation of “deep frying of yeast dough or cake batter” until January 1, 
2011.  See id. at § 114377 (b)(2).    
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example, California strictly regulates the snacks available to children on public school 
property.  In 2005, California passed Senate Bill 12, which set standards for foods sold in 
public K-12 schools, and Senate Bill 965, which set standards for beverages sold in the 
same facilities.
115 West Virginia does not permit soda to be sold in schools during 
breakfast or lunch periods.
116  At least twenty-one other states have considered legislation 
to restrict snacks or beverages available through vending machines.
117  
  The State’s paternalism in this context is likely tolerated, and perhaps broadly 
supported, both because it occurs on school grounds, where the government enjoys broad 
authority under the doctrine of parens patriae,
118 and because the restrictions merely 
limit the food choices of children, who are not yet viewed as completely autonomous 
decision-makers.  These factors are likely also at least partly responsible for why 
Congress has only seriously discussed addressing unhealthy advertising aimed at 
children.
119  In contrast, State action that restricts the choices of adults has not been so 
openly received.   
                                                 
115  See Cal.Educ.Code § 49430-49431.7.  While non-fried fruits/vegetables, nuts, nut 
butters, seeds, eggs, and string cheese are always permitted, other snacks offered for sale 
in elementary schools must meet the following standards: (1) no more than thirty-five 
percent of calories from fat, (2) no more than ten percent of calories from saturated fat, 
(3) no more than thirty-five percent of total weight from sugar, and (4) no more than 175 
calories per food item.  See id at § 49431.1.  Snacks offered for sale in middle or high 
schools must meet the same requirements, except that snacks may contain up to 250 
calories per food item.  See id. at § 49431.2.   
116  W. Va. Code, § 18-2-6a (2009). 
117  See Garcia, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. at 570, supra n. 10. 
118  The traditional parens patriae (i.e. “parent of his or her country”) authority of the 
state permits compulsory education laws and a variety of other infringements on the 
autonomy of children.  See e.g. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
119  See Section IV.A.2, supra.  
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  In July of 2008, the Los Angeles City Council unanimously passed an ordinance 
establishing a moratorium on all new fast-food restaurants in selected areas of Los 
Angeles.
120  In the areas of the city affected by the ordinance, 45% of the restaurants 
could be categorized as fast-food, compared to only 16% on the west side of the city.
121  
Clearly aware of potential attacks on the ground of government paternalism, city officials 
were careful to frame the ordinance as expanding alternatives, rather than prohibiting 
unhealthy food choices: “[t]his ordinance is in no way attempting to tell people what to 
eat but rather responding to the need to attract sit-down restaurants, full service grocery 
stores, and healthy food alternatives.  Ultimately, this ordinance is about providing 
choices--something that is currently lacking in our community.”
122  Despite city officials’ 
careful wording, the City Ordinance received heated negative publicity in the national 
press.
123   
  Thus, while advocates of removing unhealthy foods have had some success at the 
state and local level, their efforts have been limited to liberal communities or 
circumscribed areas of heightened state authority.  Even where unhealthy foods are 
                                                 
120  Los Angeles City Council Ordinance 180103, available at 
http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinedocs/2007/07-1658_ord_180103.pdf (last visiting March 28, 
2010).  
121  Id. at 1. 
122  Robert Creighton, Cheeseburgers, Race, and Paternalism: Los Angeles’ Ban on Fast 
Food Restaurants, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 249, 257 (2009) (quoting Press Release, Jan C. 
Perry, Councilwoman Ninth District, S. Los Angeles Fast Food Interim Control 
Ordinance Unanimously Approved by Los Angeles City Council (July 29, 2008)). 
123  See e.g. William Saleton, Food Apartheid, SLATE, July 31, 2008, available at 
http://www.slate.com/id/2196397/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009) (“This is the argument 
normally made for restricting children's food options at school--that they're more 
dependent and vulnerable than the rest of us. How do you feel about treating poor people 
like children?”).  
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restricted, the officials implementing the policies generally disclaim the significance of 
their restrictive effects.   
V.  UPDATING THE UNITED STATES’ ANTI-OBESITY MODEL 
 
   Despite impassioned pleas from some corners, the Untied States has generally 
resisted deviating from its education-driven anti-obesity effort.  The menu labeling 
requirement passed with the 2010 health care legislation indicates that the United States 
is likely to continue down this path.  This Section evaluates whether the United States’ 
emphasis on education campaigns is likely to be effective given its history, and proposes 
that the United States experiment with some methods of direct intervention in order to 
combat the historic rates of obesity.  
A.  Education Campaigns Have Not Reduced Obesity Rates 
  Despite state and federal efforts over the last several decades, the number of 
overweight and obese Americans continues to grow.
124   There is no evidence that 
governmental anti-obesity efforts have affected either obesity rates or, more importantly, 
the morbidity and disease rates attributable to obesity.
125  Research has indicated that 
large-scale information campaigns like those sponsored by the federal government are 
ineffective at altering the dietary or exercise behavior of individuals.
126  In fact, it is not 
even clear that the nutrition information mandated by the FDA or menu disclosures 
required by the 2010 health care legislation are addressing the relevant issue.  “Contrary 
to popular belief, there is no consistent evidence that the current epidemic of obesity is 
                                                 
124  See Section I, supra.   
125  See Mayer, 92 GEO. L.J. at 1019, supra n. 7.   
126 See Garcia, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. at 538, supra n. 10 (citing David R. Buchanan, 
DISQUIETUDES, IN PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS: A READER 339, 339-40 (Lawrence 
O. Gostin ed., 2002).  
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due to an increase in caloric intake . . . .”
127  Whatever the reason, educational campaigns 
have had little success combating rising rates of obesity, and definitely not enough 
success to warrant their status as the primary method of obesity reduction sponsored by 
the federal government.  
  Although is not entirely clear why these initiatives have failed to make a 
substantial impact, many scholars and researches have proposed explanations for why 
obesity rates have increased despite the billions of dollars spent to educate the public.  
For example, Urban sprawl, an amorphous term used to describe “uncontrolled, poorly 
planned, low-density, and single-use development, which often expands noncontiguously 
from a metropolitan area”,
128 has been argued to contribute to the sedentary lifestyle 
choices made by overweight and obese Americans.
129  Urban Sprawl tends to create 
communities with no sidewalks, no parks, long commute-times, and has been directly 
correlated “to reduced leisure-time physical activity.”
130  In essence, obesity may be a 
byproduct of our city planning.  Academics have proposed numerous other theories to 
explain the obesity phenomenon.
131 
  Theories like Urban Sprawl, effective “junk food” advertising, and the fact that 
the health consequences of obesity generally impose only long-term costs, may all 
                                                 
127  Id. (quoting Claude Bouchard, Obesity in Adulthood--The Importance of Childhood 
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(Summer 2003).  
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contribute to obesity rates in ways that education campaigns cannot remedy.  Reinforcing 
that exercise is important to a healthy lifestyle does not address the reality that many 
Americans do not have realistic access to recreation facilities.  Government nutrition 
information may be drowned-out by the barrage of fast-food advertising.  And even full-
informed Americans may believe that the increased risk of some diseases decades down 
the line just isn’t worth the new exercise regimen or the inability to eat at their favorite 
“value meal” at lunch.  Further complicating the matter, recent animal research suggests 
that “overconsumption of high-calorie food can trigger addiction-like responses in the 
brain and that high-calorie food can turn rats into compulsive eaters in a laboratory 
setting.”
132  This emerging research suggests that obese and overweight Americans may 
be drawn to food in a way that healthy lifestyle education does not combat.  Whatever the 
reason, the failure of information campaigns—when viewed in light of studies and 
academic literature that plausibly demonstrate ignorance may not be the problem—
counsels against investing significant resources in education programs at the expense of 
direct intervention. 
B.  Barriers to Direct Intervention  
  American policymakers must walk a fine line between creating effective anti-
obesity programs and infringing the autonomy of a public wary of new paternalistic 
intervention.   Advocates of fat and junk food taxes, as well as other forms of government 
intervention, must bear the condemnation of commentators vehemently opposed to a 
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national nanny.
133  Even assuming the worst about obesity—that it is directly responsible 
for premature deaths and billions of dollars in increased medical costs—many believe 
that the choice of what to eat should be left to the autonomous individual.  As one 








The intensity of anti-paternalistic sentiment in the United States will be a significant 
bound on any new anti-obesity program.  Its importance has led some commentators to 
speculate that “the range of federal policies that may be acceptable to the general public 
may be the most limiting factor of all in implementing a food policy that is based on 
health outcomes.”
135  Given this sentiment, it is unlikely that the federal government 
would be able to implement the invasive regulatory schemes developed by the United 
Kingdom and Japan.   
  However, attacks of government paternalism only reach so far.  We do not live in 
a country or a world which tolerates all “personal” choices made by its citizens.  
Government frequently intervenes to influence the choices of individuals in order to 
lessen the burden of negative externalities.  The quintessential example of this 
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intervention is mandatory seatbelt and motorcycle helmet laws, which endure despite 
vehement opposition by libertarians and scholars alike.
136  Although the decision to wear 
a seatbelt or helmet can be framed as a purely personal choice, the health consequences 
and costs borne by the community are thought sufficient to justify government 
interference.   
  Most Americans favor or tolerate paternalistic seatbelt and helmet laws because 
the relatively minor imposition is justified by a known value to society.  Approximately 
eighty-one percent of Americans favor motorcycle helmet laws.
137  However, only thirty-
three percent are in favor of a tax on unhealthy food products.
138  Some of this difference 
can be explained by the fact that the vast majority of people buy unhealthy products from 
time to time while only a small population drive motorcycles.  It is also possible that 
support for helmet and seatbelt laws are high because it is proven to be effective.  For 
example, we know that wearing a seatbelt greatly reduces the risk of death or injury, 
while there is no proof that interventionist anti-obesity programs will lower obesity rates.  
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has established that wearing a 
seatbelt reduces the risk of death by forty-five percent and the risk of serious injury by 
fifty percent.
139   There is no similar figure for a fat tax, junk food tax, advertising ban or 
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double-bacon cheeseburger ban.  Restrictions on liberty may be particularly difficult to 
swallow when there is no evidence that the restriction will be effective.  
C.  Proposed Role of the FDA 
  To date, the FDA has been primarily concerned with disseminating nutritional 
information and identifying unsafe or mislabeled food products.
140  For example, while 
some cities and the state of California have banned the use of trans fat in restaurants 
within their jurisdictions, the FDA is content to merely require trans fat disclosure on its 
nutrition label.
141  The increasing obesity rate over the last three decades is evidence that 
mere dissemination of nutrition information is not an effective strategy.  However, 
implementing a directly interventionist policy through the FDA will likely be difficult 
given anti-paternalistic sentiment across the country.  Instead, the FDA should mimic the 
role of the United Kingdom’s FSA and begin to categorize foods based on each product’s 
health benefits.
142  Categorizing foods instead of merely relating nutrition information 
would have two primary benefits. 
  First, labeling one product unhealthy and another healthy may motivate more 
consumers to choose the healthy product because it would no longer be necessary to 
spend minutes wading through nutrition information to determine its health 
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characteristics.
143  Second, and more importantly, this system would allow state 
governments and other federal agencies to target unhealthy foods with their own 
programs.  In essence, an FDA categorization system would facilitate the kind of direct 
intervention programs that state and city governments have been toying with for years.  
By bearing the cost and controversy that inevitably accompanies such an undertaking, the 
FDA would pave the way for other governmental actors to experiment with programs 
similar to those enacted oversees.  For example, San Francisco, in addition to banning 
trans fats, could enact a twenty percent “junk food tax” on all foods classified in the 
FDA’s most unhealthy category.  Seattle may choose to imitate the scheme devised by 
the Classification and Rating Administration for movies rated “R”, and require parents to 
accompany their children when buying snacks in the unhealthiest category.  By absorbing 
the costs of categorization, the FDA would lower the barrier to entry and support a 
variety of state and local anti-obesity programs. 
  In addition to potentially lowering the incidence of obesity in some communities, 
the programs enacted in response to the FDA’s categorization will build a record of the 
successes and failures of a variety of anti-obesity techniques.  In essence, each program 
adopted by San Francisco, Seattle, or Boston, will serve as a trial run for the federal 
government. For example, the federal government may avoid Seattle’s prohibition on 
selling junk food to children without a parent if it proves too difficult to administer.  
However, if San Francisco’s junk food tax lowers the obesity rate by three percent over a 
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three year period, advocates of direct intervention will be armed with hard data when 
making their case before Congress.  Encouraging state and local-level programs to 
implement anti-obesity approaches will also minimize government paternalism in 
unsupportive communities, at least until the benefits of a program are sufficient to 
warrant adoption by the federal government.  By letting receptive communities 
experiment with interventionist programs, the federal government will avoid contentious 
debate about the proper role of government until a time where tangible evidence can 
inform the discussion.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
  Obesity is a complex issue that defies simple solutions.   Despite intense political 
will and academic interest, there is no consensus about why obesity rates have 
skyrocketed or how they can be reduced.   The proposal advanced here is relatively 
modest.  Instead of depending solely on information campaigns that rely on the dubious 
assumption of consumer ignorance, the federal government should transition towards 
programs that incentivize healthy lifestyle choices.  However, the federal government 
should not blindly wade into this controversial and complex arena.  By categorizing foods 
in a way similar to the United Kingdom’s FSA, the federal government can begin by 
removing a significant barrier to the proliferation of a variety of state and local anti-
obesity programs.  By encouraging these programs, the federal government can benefit 
from their collective experience when crafting its own response. 